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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Employers and job seekers are brought together for potential matches through their 
recruitment and job search activities.  Employers may post help wanted signs, run newspaper 
advertisements, or seek referrals from private employment agencies.  Job seekers may speak with 
friends and relatives, solicit the aid of the state employment agency, or simply walk in and apply.  
These recruitment and search activities help both parties acquire information about each other, 
and the more information they obtain prior to entering an employment agreement the higher the 
likelihood of a good employment match.  The crucial role of information in the labor market has 
been recognized since Stigler (1962), but despite a voluminous literature on job matching and 
organizational behavior in labor markets, we know far less about employers’ recruitment 
strategies than about job seekers’ search strategies.  As Granovetter (1995) notes, “while people 
are finding jobs, employers are finding people to fill them, and their behaviors, strategies, and 
purposes play a central but often neglected role in the process of matching people to jobs.”  This 
imbalance in research effort is explained more by a dearth of adequate data describing employer 
recruitment behavior than by lack of scholarly interest.  Indeed, labor economists, sociologists, 
psychologists, and human resource management specialists have spent the last half-century 
exploiting the meager existing data sets in efforts to learn about employer recruitment behavior.   
In this paper I address several empirical questions concerning employer recruitment using 
the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), a large cross sectional survey of employers 
in four metropolitan areas of the United States that has not been exploited for a detailed analysis 
of the relationships among recruitment strategies, starting wages, and vacancy duration, despite 
the richness of the data set for this purpose.  The MCSUI data contain detailed information on 
firm and job characteristics and, most importantly for the purpose of this paper, indicators of the 
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recruitment methods these employers used when hiring the most recently hired worker.  The data 
allow a number of interesting questions to be addressed concerning the link between employer 
recruitment choices and starting wages, vacancy duration, and the skill levels of new hires.  As 
there has been relatively little empirical research done by labor economists on employer 
recruitment, this work with a relatively large representative sample of employers should enhance 
our understanding of a number of basic questions.  I consider three of these.   
First, I present evidence describing which recruitment methods employers use and how 
these vary by firm characteristics, vacancy characteristics, and the skill requirements of jobs.  I 
estimate a multivariate probit model with a separate equation for each of ten recruitment choices.  
In addition to providing information about the relationship of each recruitment method with each 
of the covariates, this method has the attractive feature of allowing for an analysis of the 
relationships among the unobserved determinants of recruitment choice.  To my knowledge, this 
methodology is new to the recruitment literature.   
Second, I present regression evidence showing how vacancy duration varies by 
recruitment choices.  Some recruitment methods can be expected to be faster than others in 
generating job applicants.  However, since an employer must invest time in screening the 
applicant pool, the recruitment methods that generate applicants quickly do not necessarily fill 
vacancies quickly.  Therefore the link between recruitment methods and vacancy durations is an 
empirical question.   
Third, I present evidence concerning the relationship between starting wages and 
recruitment methods.  In particular, I augment standard log-wage specifications based on the 
human capital model with recruitment choices and find that the recruitment variables have 
explanatory power, even in the presence of all of the usual controls.  One can envision alternative 
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theoretical mechanisms by which recruitment choices are associated with starting wages.  In this 
paper I appeal to a wage-posting model as the theoretical framework underlying the empirical 
work, and I provide some empirical justification for this view.     
I follow the convention in the recruitment literature of treating recruitment strategies as 
exogenous in equations for starting wage and vacancy duration.  A typical paper regresses a 
variable describing some labor market outcome, such as a starting wage, on various “recruitment 
dummies”, controlling for firm and vacancy characteristics.  In this paper I provide analogous 
information from the MCSUI data.  Since many of the past studies have been on narrower 
datasets than the MCSUI, restricted only to certain worker or employer types, there is more to be 
learned from a wide and representative cross section of metropolitan area employers.          
Recruitment methods are purposefully chosen by employers, however, and are likely 
determined by many of the same factors that determine wage offers.  Strictly speaking then, the 
recruitment choice is endogenous, and if we wish to analyze policies that operate through the 
channel of employer recruitment choice, we require an economic model in which wages and 
recruitment choice are endogenous variables.  Such a dynamic structural model is proposed and 
estimated in DeVaro (2003) using the MCSUI data.  In the present paper, I am simply interested 
in measuring correlations between recruitment methods and these other labor market outcomes 
after controlling for other factors, including firm characteristics and city controls.  For this 
purpose a regression analysis is useful, facilitating a finer classification of recruitment strategies 
than the highly aggregated categories of “informal methods”, “formal methods”, and “both 
methods simultaneously” that are used in the structural analysis in DeVaro (2003).   
I begin the discussion with a review of the previous literature on employer recruitment.  
Next I describe the data set and present a theoretical framework for thinking about recruitment 
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strategies, vacancy duration, and wages.  The empirical results follow, with a separate subsection 
for each of the three research questions.  I then draw together the empirical findings with some 
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. 
 
II.  PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Although the literature on employer recruitment has spanned five decades, dating back to 
some early empirical papers by Malm in the 1950s, research in this area did not begin in earnest 
until the mid 1960s to early 1970s, with seminal work by Rees (1966), Rees and Shultz (1970), 
and Granovetter (1974).  In the economics literature the stage was set by Stigler (1962), which 
emphasized the crucial role of information in the labor market.  Rees (1966) then explored the 
role of the recruitment choice as an information-generating device.  More recently, Montgomery 
(1991) embedded social networks in an adverse selection model to analyze the effects of social 
networks on labor market outcomes.   
Following Rees, the fashion in the recruitment literature has been to distinguish between 
“formal” and “informal” recruiting methods.  Informal or word-of-mouth methods involve 
asking current employees or friends for referrals, or accepting walk-ins.  Formal methods are 
usually defined to encompass everything else, most notably advertising and soliciting referrals 
from various employment agencies.  Rees documents the prevalence of informal methods in 
recruiting blue and white-collar workers in a Chicago-area study and argues that the 
effectiveness of informal networks is under appreciated.  Prior to Rees’ work, the conventional 
view was that formal methods provided better information than informal methods, thereby 
contributing to the efficient functioning of the labor market.  In counterpoint, Rees and Shultz 
(1970) write “… we do not feel that this reliance [on informal methods] is necessarily evidence 
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of an imperfect market.  Rather it suggests to us the importance of kinds of qualitative 
information about job seekers and about vacant jobs that could not be communicated well 
through formal channels, such as newspaper ads and employment agencies…” 
 In highlighting the role of recruitment choice as an information-generating device, Rees 
and Schultz distinguish between “extensive” and “intensive” information.  Extensive information 
pertains to the number of job seekers and vacancies covered by the information, while intensive 
information provides detailed information about specific job seekers or vacancies.  Recruiting 
methods such as newspaper advertising are effective in generating substantial extensive 
information, for example a high volume of applicants, but the information about individual 
applicants is usually quite limited.  In contrast, informal methods provide inside information on a 
smaller but more select group of applicants.  Employers’ recruitment choices therefore depend 
on the type of worker desired, the direct costs of the recruitment method, and how quickly the 
worker is needed.  Rees argues that informal methods, by generating more intensive information 
(both for the job seeker and the employer) lead to better employment matches. 
 Rees’ identification of the information-generating function of recruitment choice 
spawned a literature exploring the effects of recruitment choice on the quality of the resulting 
employment matches.  Research in the psychology literature mostly during the 1970s suggested 
that more information, positive as well as negative, prior to the start of an employment 
relationship is associated with lower turnover (Gannon 1971; Farr, O’Leary and Bartlett 1973; 
Ilgen and Seely 1974; Wanous 1973, 1975; Mencken and Winfield 1998).  More recent empirical 
work by labor economists has generally supported the hypothesis that informal recruiting 
methods are associated with higher productivity and longer average tenure than other methods 
(Reid 1972; Datcher 1983; Barron, Bishop and Hollenbeck 1983; Holzer 1987; Roper 1988; 
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Simon and Warner 1992; van Ours and Ridder 1992; Bishop 1993; Gorter, Nijkamp and Rietveld 
1996; DeVaro and Fields 2004). 
 A noteworthy theoretical development is due to Montgomery (1991), who considers a 
standard adverse selection model augmented to include a structure of social ties.  Workers in the 
model are observationally equivalent with respect to ability, and may or may not have a friend to 
recommend to their employer.  High-ability workers tend to know other high ability workers, 
while low-ability workers tend to know other low-ability workers.  Although ability is ex ante 
unobservable to the employer, after observing a worker for one period the employer learns his 
ability.  After learning a worker’s ability, an employer wishing to hire through referral will post a 
wage offer that may be conveyed by the worker to his acquaintance.  Jobseekers then compare 
received offers and choose the highest one.  The model demonstrates how social structure can be 
integrated into formal economic analysis.   
 DeVaro (2003) diverges from the previous empirical literature on recruitment by treating 
the recruitment choice as endogenous in a dynamic structural model.  The model is estimated 
using data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality and then policy simulations are run to 
analyze a number of government policies designed to improve job placement rates for low-
skilled workers.  These policies include the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, the Work 
Opportunity Tax Credit, and the Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit, and all of them have labor market 
effects by altering employer recruitment choices.  The distinguishing feature of this work is that, 
unlike the previous recruitment literature, it takes a structural approach in treating the employer’s 
recruitment choice as endogenous.   
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III.  DATA:  MULTI-CITY STUDY OF URBAN INEQUALITY (MCSUI) 
 The 3510 observations in the data are from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality 
(MCSUI), a cross sectional telephone survey of employers in Los Angeles, Boston, Detroit and 
Atlanta, conducted in 1992-1995.  Harry Holzer conducted the bulk of the survey, producing 
3213 cases.  A supplement of 297 cases was provided by Kirschenman, Tilly, and Moss.  The 
bulk of the observations in the data set concern the hiring and employment of each 
establishment’s most recently hired worker.  Telephone screening was used in an effort to 
identify a respondent who actually hired the most recently hired worker.  The respondent was the 
owner in 14.5% of the cases, the manager or supervisor in 42%, a personnel department official 
in 31.5%, and someone else in 12%.  The survey instrument took 30-45 minutes to administer on 
the telephone, with an overall response rate of 67%.  More detail on the data set is provided in 
Holzer (1996). 
 Slightly less than two thirds of the cases were drawn from regional employment 
directories provided by Survey Sampling, Inc. (SSI) based on local telephone directories.  This 
was a sample stratified by establishment size and designed to be self-weighting.  Slightly more 
than one third of the cases were drawn from the current or most recent employer reported by 
respondents in the companion MCSUI household survey.  A number of considerations render the 
complete (unweighted) sample unrepresentative of the population of interest.  One issue is that 
the MCSUI household survey over-sampled low-income areas and areas with high 
concentrations of racial minorities.  A second issue is that the SSI subsample was restricted to 
employers who had hired a worker for a position that did not require a college degree within the 
previous three years, whereas the household subsample was not restricted to entry-level jobs in 
this way.  Inverse-probability sampling weights adjust for these complexities of the sampling 
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scheme, and weighted observations are a representative sample of firms such as would occur if a 
random sample of employed people were drawn from each city.  I apply these sampling weights 
throughout this study.       
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics characterizing the employers in the sample.  
The average firm size, including temporary and contract workers, is 657 and the median is 55.  
The sample representation of small firms is noteworthy; 25% of the firms have 15 or fewer 
employees.  For-profit companies comprise 76% of the sample, and only 6% are franchises.  Of 
the 62% of firms operating on multiple sites, the average number of sites is 60 and the median 
number is 3.  About a quarter of the firms have at least some employees covered by collective 
bargaining agreements, and of these firms the fraction of employees covered is about two thirds.  
Firms that have at least some contract workers comprise 30% of the sample, and those that have 
at least some temporary workers comprise about 36%.  The composition of the sample by 
industry is reflective of major metropolitan areas in the United States.  Seventy-five percent of 
the sample consists of firms in the services, manufacturing, and retail trade industries, and most 
of the remaining firms are in wholesale trade, finance, or transportation, with less than 4% of the 
sample in construction, public administration, mining, and agriculture, forestry or fishing.  
In addition to the firm characteristics summarized in Table 1, the key variables used in 
this paper are:  recruitment methods, vacancy duration, starting wages, and the skill requirements 
of jobs, each of which I now briefly describe. 
The survey contains two types of information about recruitment.  First, employers are 
asked which of a list of methods (posting help wanted signs, running newspaper advertisements, 
accepting walk-ins, seeking referrals from current employees or friends, seeking referrals from 
state, private, or community employment agencies, or referrals from school placement officers or 
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unions) were used in the recruitment campaign to hire the most recently hired worker.  
Employers answer “yes” or “no” to each method that was used, and most employers report the 
use of multiple methods.  Second, the survey asks which of these individual methods actually 
generated the most recently hired worker.  In response to this question, the employer may select 
only one method.   
The vacancy duration question is worded as follows:  “From the time you began 
recruiting until you hired someone, how long did it take to hire your newest employee [in 
weeks]?”   
When asked the starting wage of the most recent hire, about 70% of employers responded 
with an hourly wage.  The other 30% reported a weekly, monthly, or annual wage, and these I 
converted to hourly wages assuming standard work schedules.  I then deflated all hourly wages 
to 1990 dollars using the CPI-UX.  
Three different measures of the skill requirements of jobs are used in this paper: an 
indicator for whether the position requires a college degree, the occupation, and the frequency 
with which various tasks must be performed on the job.  These tasks include talking face-to-face 
or on the phone with customers or clients, reading instructions, writing memos, doing math, and 
working with computers.  In the wage regressions, rather than using the indicator for whether the 
position requires a college degree I use the educational attainment (college or post-college, with 
less than college serving as the reference group) of the most recently hired worker.  Obviously, 
the correlation between the indicator for whether the position requires a college degree and 
whether the most recent hire actually has at least a college degree is extremely high.   
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IV.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR RECRUITMENT CHOICES, VACANCY 
DURATION, AND WAGES 
A theoretical framework for understanding the determination of employer recruitment 
choices, starting wages, vacancy duration, and the skill level of new hires is provided in the 
dynamic structural model proposed by DeVaro (2003).  I now draw on some of the main ideas 
underlying that model to provide some intuition and motivation for the empirical work in the 
following section.  
Recruitment methods may usefully be thought of as the initial means by which an 
employer collects information about potential hires.  The recruitment choice affects the quality, 
size, and arrival speed of the applicant pool.  To capture these ideas, the basic structure of the 
underlying theoretical framework has employers choosing recruitment strategies, wage offers, 
and worker type (or skill level) to maximize expected profits.  Specifically, the employer’s quest 
to fill a vacancy is modeled as a multi-period recruitment problem.  The employer begins the 
recruitment campaign by choosing in the first period a worker type (skill level), a recruitment 
strategy (a bundle of recruitment methods), and a posted wage offer (“high” or “low” for 
simplicity).   
When making their choice of recruitment strategies, we assume that employers are faced 
with a fundamental tradeoff between speed of hiring and expected match quality of the worker.  
That is, some recruitment methods quickly generate an applicant pool of modest quality and 
others yield a smaller but more select group of applicants.  This “quality versus speed tradeoff” 
in choosing recruitment methods is a central assumption of the model.  Hiring decisions in this 
model are stochastic, with distributions that vary with the employer’s choices.   
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Although the choices of worker-type and recruitment strategy that are made at the outset 
remain fixed for the duration of the campaign, the employer retains the option of adjusting the 
posted wage offers as the recruitment campaign progresses.  In particular, if the campaign is 
going badly the employer can increase the offered wage in an attempt to lure applicants faster.  A 
key point to note from this structure is that an employer can influence hiring speed in two ways:  
either through the recruitment choice or through the posted wage offer.  Some recruitment 
methods yield hires faster than do others, and high posted wage offers yield hires faster than do 
lower wage offers.  Another point to note is that the model implies that employers might raise the 
posted wage offer as the campaign progresses (particularly if the campaign is going badly in that 
a hire has not occurred) but will never lower the wage offer.    
The theoretical framework sketched here motivates the empirical questions asked in the 
following section.  Since match quality will be relatively more important to some employers and 
hiring speed relatively more important to others, recruitment choices can be expected to vary by 
firm characteristics and the desired worker skill level.  Which characteristics are associated with 
different recruitment choices is the question addressed in Section 5.1.  The theoretical framework 
also suggests that vacancy duration should vary with recruitment choice.  Which particular 
recruitment methods are associated with longer or shorter vacancy durations is an empirical 
question, and I confront this in Section 5.2.   
Although the traditional human capital model for wages does not typically include 
employer recruitment choices, the wage-posting theoretical framework suggests a channel of 
influence implying an association between starting wages and recruitment choice.  Recall that the 
employer can increase hiring speed either through the recruitment choice (that is, choosing faster 
methods) or through the wage offer (that is, posting higher wage offers).  This suggests that 
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recruitment choices will have explanatory power in a standard wage regression, and I explore 
this in Section 5.3 by augmenting standard wage regressions to include recruitment choices.   
The model offers a simple framework for understanding the determination of recruitment 
choices, starting wages, and vacancy duration and, at an anecdotal level, appears plausible as a 
description of many hiring processes.  Nonetheless, there are obviously alternative stories one 
could envision, particularly concerning the determination of starting wages.  My framework is 
based on a wage-posting game in which the employer sets wage offers and therefore determines 
the starting wage.  One could imagine other mechanisms, such as ex post bargaining, for 
determining the starting wage.  A more compelling case can be made for the model if some 
empirical support can be found for the notion of employer wage-posting in recruitment 
campaigns. 
 
Empirical Support for the Wage-Posting Framework 
An implication of the model is that although the employer may choose to raise the posted 
wage offer as the recruitment campaign progresses, the wage offer will never be lowered.  This 
implies, ceteris paribus, a positive correlation between offered wages and vacancy duration.  
This implication would appear to be untestable, since the MCSUI data contain only starting 
wages, not offered wages.  The model might also seem to imply a positive correlation between 
vacancy duration and starting wages, since longer vacancy durations induce some employers to 
increase their wage offers.  The trouble with this is that a high wage offer from the outset is more 
likely than a low wage offer to yield a short duration.  If a high starting wage is observed in the 
data, there is no way to determine whether that employer’s offered wage was high from the 
outset of the campaign, or if it started low and was raised later.  Employers who offer high wages 
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from the outset are likely to experience shorter vacancy durations than those who start out with 
low wages and switch to high wages later.   
This discussion suggests that in a regression of vacancy duration on starting wages, a 
positive estimated slope provides no evidence in favor of the wage-posting model or against it.  
If we restrict our attention to the subsample of employers who hired someone very quickly, 
however, then offered wages are essentially the same as starting wages, since few if any 
employers would have increased their wage offer in such a short time.  In contrast, the full 
sample will contain many employers who raised their wage offer at some point(s) during the 
recruitment campaign.  So the wage-posting model does imply that if we run the above 
regression on successive subsamples (a hire occurring within the first two weeks, within the first 
three weeks, within the first four weeks, …) the slope coefficient should increase with the size of 
the subsample.  The reason is that as we increase the sample size in this way, we include more 
employers who raised their initial wage offer (because the recruitment campaign was going 
badly) and these high-starting-wage employers will experience longer vacancy durations than 
employers who offered a high wage from the start. 
Figure 1 presents the results of these regressions on successive subsamples.  The vertical 
axis gives the slope coefficient of a regression of (number of weeks to hire the most recently 
hired employee) on a constant and (hourly starting wage for this worker).  The horizontal axis 
indicates the subsample, so “2” refers to the regression using only those observations for which 
the hire occurred in less than two weeks after the start of the recruitment campaign.  The graph is 
monotonically increasing, as predicted by the model. 
Of course, an alternative interpretation is that this graph might reflect heterogeneity in the 
types of positions employers seek to fill.  To address this possibility, Figure 2 plots the slope 
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coefficients of the starting wage for an analogous series of regressions on successive subsamples, 
though these regressions also include controls for the type of position.  In particular, the 
regressions include ten industry controls, four occupation controls, indicators for whether the 
position requires a college degree, whether the firm is a franchise, fraction of unionized 
employment, establishment size, and number of sites of operation.  Since Figure 2 displays an 
increasing pattern similar to that of Figure 1, this lends credence to the wage-posting 
interpretation as opposed to the unobserved heterogeneity interpretation.  Although it does not 
provide definitive evidence, as some obvious alternative theories for the wage-generating process 
-- such as ex-post bargaining -- would not have the implication of an increasing pattern, the 
graph provides some empirical support for the wage-posting framework.  
 
V.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RECRUITMENT, STARTING WAGES, AND VACANCY 
DURATION 
In the following subsections I present empirical evidence concerning the three main 
questions of the paper:  How do employer recruitment choices vary by firm and vacancy 
characteristics and the skill requirements of jobs?  How does vacancy duration vary with 
recruitment choice?  How do starting wages vary with recruitment choice?  
  
5.1 How do Employer Recruitment Choices Vary by Firm and Vacancy Characteristics and the 
Skill Requirements of Jobs? 
In the model of the previous section, employers choose recruitment methods in 
recognition of a tradeoff between hiring speed and the quality of potential matches.  In a cross 
section of establishments, employers will differ in the relative weights they place on these 
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objectives.  Furthermore, the same employer might make different recruitment choices according 
to the skill needs of the vacant position.  We should therefore expect to see observed recruitment 
choices varying with firm and vacancy characteristics and the skill requirements of jobs.  
Identifying these empirical relationships is the purpose of the present subsection.   
For each employer in the sample we observe which of ten methods they used in recruiting 
their most recent hire.  Table 2 displays the fraction of employers that used each of these 
methods in the campaign to hire the most recent worker.  As noted in Holzer (1996), by far the 
most frequently used method is seeking referrals from current employees.  Since the fractions in 
this table sum to well over 100%, it is clear that many employers use multiple methods 
simultaneously.  In fact, the average and median number of methods used is four.  To get a sense 
of which methods are bundled together and which are used apart, let us consider the correlation 
matrix for the ten methods.  As seen in Panel A of Table 3, every correlation is positive, a 
number of them are sizeable, and nearly all are statistically significant.  No pair of methods 
appears to be substitutes in the sense that the use of one is associated with less frequent use of 
the other.   
Although this correlation matrix answers the simple question of which methods tend to 
be bundled together in the cross section, the MCSUI sample represents a highly diverse group of 
employers and jobs.  An interesting question that is not illuminated by the correlation matrix is 
what methods tend to be bundled together, or used apart, by observably similar employers.  That 
is, holding constant such characteristics as firm size, industry, and the skill requirements of jobs, 
what recruitment methods tend to be bundled together or used apart?  I answer this question 
using a multivariate probit analysis, simultaneously estimating equations for each of the ten 
recruitment methods.1  The main advantage of the multivariate probit for our purpose is that it 
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yields unrestricted estimates of the full set of 45 cross-equation correlations in the unobserved 
determinants of recruitment choice.  Examination of these correlations provides insights into 
which recruitment methods tend to be used together across firms and jobs with similar 
observable characteristics.   
Specifically, the multivariate probit model I estimate is: 
Prob(Rj = 1) = Φ(βj’x)  j = 1, 2, …, 10 
where Φ is the standard normal cdf; Rj is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the jth recruitment 
method was chosen in the campaign to hire the most recent worker, and 0 if this method was not 
chosen; βj is a parameter vector in the jth equation; and x is a vector of covariates that includes 
the general categories of firm characteristics, industry controls, job tasks, worker skill levels, and 
city controls.   
Firm characteristics include firm size, the number of sites on which the firm operates, the 
fraction of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement, and dummy variables for 
whether the firm is for-profit, whether it is a franchise, whether some employees are contract 
workers, and whether some employees are temporary workers.  Industry controls are dummy 
variables for agriculture, forestry, and fishing; mining; manufacturing; transportation; wholesale 
trade; retail trade; finance; services; and public administration, treating construction as the 
reference group.  Job tasks are dummy variables that equal one if a particular task is required in 
the position on a daily basis, and zero otherwise.  These tasks include:   
talk:  talking face-to-face with customers or clients;  
phone:  talking over the phone with customers or clients; 
read:  reading instructions at least one paragraph long; 
write: writing paragraphs or memos; 
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math:  doing arithmetic or other computations; 
computer:  working with a computer 
The skill level is measured using four broad occupational controls (professionals, sales, services, 
operators and laborers) and a dummy for whether a college degree is required for the position.    
In this application of the multivariate probit, we envision a continuous (normally 
distributed) latent index for each of the ten recruitment methods.  This may be interpreted as the 
employer’s propensity to use that particular method, and it is a function of both observed and 
unobserved characteristics of the employer and job.  The observed recruitment choice is a 
discrete indicator that the latent index exceeds some threshold.  The disturbance in this context 
represents the part of the latent index that is unrelated to observed firm characteristics, so it can 
be interpreted as the propensity to use the given method for observably similar employers and 
jobs.  We are interested in the correlations between these propensities across equations 
representing different recruitment methods, and these are displayed in Panel B of Table 3.          
 The broad pattern of evidence from the residual correlations in Panel B is similar to the 
pattern of recruitment correlations from Panel A in the sense that most correlations are positive 
and statistically significant, and many are large in magnitude.  The most noteworthy differences 
pertain to informal recruitment through friends.  Panel B clearly reveals that referrals from 
friends are different from other recruitment methods.  This method tends to be bundled with no 
method other than referrals from school placement officers; it is also the only method that is 
negatively related to other methods.  In contrast, the recruitment correlations are somewhat 
misleading in suggesting that this method tends to be bundled with referrals from current 
employees, private and temporary employment agencies, community employment agencies, 
school placement officers, and unions.  Furthermore, while the recruitment correlations suggest 
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that this method is completely uncorrelated with recruitment through newspaper advertising, the 
residual correlations reveal a negative relationship between these methods.   
One interpretation of the negative relationship between newspaper advertising and 
informal referrals from friends among observably similar employers can be found in the model 
of the previous section.  This could reflect a tradeoff of match quality and hiring speed in 
recruitment methods.  While newspaper advertising generates a large applicant pool, anyone who 
reads an ad is free to apply for the job.  Hence, this method provides no pre-screening of 
applicants, and expected match quality is likely to be low.  In contrast, informal referrals from 
friends are likely to generate a much smaller and slower flow of applicants, though the pool will 
be of higher average quality.  It is interesting that recruitment through school placement officers 
is the one method that gets bundled with referrals from friends.  Given that employers frequently 
have ongoing relationships and repeated interactions with the same school placement officers, it 
is plausible that this method could yield an applicant pool similar to that generated by informal 
referrals from friends.  As we shall see later, both methods are associated with longer vacancy 
duration and higher starting wages.  This is consistent with the notion that employers who favor 
recruitment bundles containing these methods are likely to favor match quality over hiring speed.  
It is interesting to note, however, that informal referrals from current employees are 
clearly bundled with newspaper advertising even though informal referrals from friends are not.  
This would seem to be at odds with the idea of a tradeoff between informal methods and 
newspaper advertising.  But the data suggest that informal recruitment through current 
employees probably means something different than informal recruitment through friends.  As 
the residual correlations show, these methods are clearly not bundled by observably similar 
employers.  A plausible hypothesis is that informal recruitment through friends yields better 
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matches than informal recruitment through current employees, because incentives are more 
likely to be aligned between an employer and his friends than between an employer and his 
current employees.  While a current employee might be willing to take some reputational risk to 
recommend a low-ability friend in need of employment, an employer’s friends will more 
frequently have the employer’s interests at heart. 
Turning to the effects of firm and job characteristics on recruitment methods, in Table 4 I 
report marginal effects from individual probit equations estimated for each recruitment method.2  
The probit estimates reveal a large number of statistically significant associations between each 
recruitment choice and firm characteristics, industry controls, job tasks, occupation controls, 
required skill levels, and city controls.  In the interests of space, I restrict the commentary to four 
of the more interesting patterns that emerge.   
First, for-profit firms are less likely than nonprofits to recruit using help wanted 
advertising, walk-ins, or state and community employment agencies.  In fact, a separate 
calculation reveals that the average number of recruitment methods used to hire the most recent 
worker is 3.65 in for-profit firms and 4.33 for nonprofit firms, and this difference in means is 
significant with a t-statistic exceeding 4.  This is a striking finding, in the presence of the other 
controls in the model, and is consistent with a growing body of evidence that the personnel 
policies of nonprofits differ systematically from those of for-profits.  Most of these studies 
concern wage differentials between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors (Weisbrod 1983; Preston 
1988; Preston 1989; Frank 1996; Leete 2001), though a recent paper by DeVaro and Samuelson 
(2003) finds that promotion rates are lower in nonprofit than in for-profit firms. 
Second, the industry controls tend not to be statistically significant.  That is, after 
controlling for other firm and vacancy characteristics, the probability of using any particular 
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recruitment method does not vary much with the industry in which the firm operates.  The 
coefficients on the “agriculture, forestry, and fishing” and “mining” industry controls are not 
very informative, given their trivial representation in this metropolitan sample.  Relative to the 
construction industry, the remaining industries have no statistically significant association with 
the probability of recruiting through any of help-wanted signs, newspaper advertising, walk-ins, 
current employee referrals, private or temp agency referrals, community agency referrals, or 
referrals from school placement officers.  The three exceptions to this pattern include referrals 
from state employment agencies, unions, or friends.  Firms in the wholesale trade and finance 
industries are less likely than in construction to recruit through the state employment agency, 
firms in retail trade are less likely than firms in construction to recruit informally through friends, 
and firms in virtually all sectors other than the highly unionized construction industry are less 
likely to recruit through union referrals.            
Third, there is a clear pattern in the types of recruitment strategies used by occupation 
and the skill requirements of jobs.  Relative to the professional occupations, employers seeking 
to fill vacancies in sales, services, or laborer/operators are more likely to rely on walk-ins, 
private and temp agency referrals, and community agency referrals and less likely to rely on 
referrals from friends.  Employers with vacancies in the lowest-skilled occupational group of 
laborers and operators are more likely to use state employment agency or union referrals than in 
the professional occupations.  When a position requires a college degree, employers are less 
likely to use walk-ins and help wanted signs (methods typically reserved for lower-skilled jobs) 
and more likely to use school referrals. 
Finally, the recruiting methods for a given position are clearly associated with the job 
tasks that are performed on a daily basis in that position.  All of the six tasks variables are 
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statistically significant in at least one recruitment equation and most of them are significant in 
more than one equation.  Jobs that require workers to talk face-to-face with customers on a daily 
basis are associated with more frequent use of help-wanted signs, accepting walk-ins, current 
employee referrals, community agency referrals, referrals from school placement officers, union 
referrals, and informal referrals from friends.  The only recruitment method negatively associated 
with this task is soliciting referrals from private employment or temp agencies.  Interestingly, the 
only recruitment method of the ten that is not positively associated with at least one daily task is 
referrals from the state employment agency.  The fact that specific skill requirements in a 
particular area do not appear to induce the employer to recruit through the state employment 
agency is consistent with the longstanding notion that recruiting through state employment 
agencies yields low-quality matches on average (Rees 1966).     
 
5.2 How Does Vacancy Duration Vary With Recruitment Choice? 
The theoretical framework of the previous section predicts an association between 
vacancy duration and recruitment choice.  Since the model is based on a tradeoff between match 
quality and hiring speed, employers can affect vacancy duration through their choice of 
recruitment methods.  Some methods can be expected to generate a large applicant pool quickly.  
But a high applicant volume does not imply a short vacancy duration, due to time spent 
screening applicants.  Since the process of sorting through a large applicant pool and screening 
the applicants consumes time, the relationship between individual recruitment strategies and 
vacancy duration is not obvious a priori and must be determined empirically.  In the MCSUI 
data the unconditional means of vacancy duration for the most recent hire (measured in weeks) 
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are displayed in Table 5, by the recruitment method that generated the most recently hired 
worker. 
 Table 6 contains maximum likelihood estimates from a parametric Weibull survival-time 
regression measuring the relationship between recruitment choice and vacancy duration, after 
controlling for firm and vacancy characteristics and city effects.3  The dependent variable is 
vacancy duration measured as the number of weeks taken to hire the newest employee.  I report 
the results in log relative-hazard form, meaning that coefficients above one imply a positive 
effect on the hazard rate (i.e. shorter vacancy duration) and those less than one imply a negative 
effect.  The log relative-hazard metric allows for a more intuitive interpretation of the 
magnitudes of the effects, as opposed to simply their signs.  For example, since the hazard ratio 
for “community agency referrals” exceeds 1 by nearly 0.25, we can say that this recruitment 
method is associated with nearly a 25% increase in the hazard rate.   
The results show that, even after controlling for firm and industry characteristics, the skill 
level of jobs, and city effects, recruiting workers through walk-ins or referrals from a community 
agency are associated with shorter vacancy durations.  In contrast, recruiting through private 
employment or temporary agencies, newspaper advertisements, or referrals from friends is 
associated with longer vacancy durations.  The underlying reason for the “slowness” of these 
latter three methods probably differs between referrals from friends and the other two methods.  
In particular, it is likely that the long duration associated with referrals from friends reflects the 
lag in actually generating applicants, whereas for the other two methods it reflects time 
investments associated with screening a large applicant pool.  DeVaro and Fields (2004) present 
some evidence in support of this view, showing that in fact the average size of the applicant pool 
is much larger when newspaper ads or private employment agency recruitment methods are used 
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than when they are not, and that the pool is smaller when referrals from friends are used than 
when they are not.   
Documenting that employers screen applicants generated by newspaper ads or private 
employment agencies more intensively than applicants generated by referrals from friends is 
more difficult.  DeVaro and Fields (2004) show that a number of screening methods are 
positively associated with the use of each of those recruitment methods.  There is evidence, 
however, that employers use a slightly larger number of screening methods when new hires are 
generated through newspaper ads or private agency referrals, as revealed in Table 7.  When new 
hires are generated by either newspaper ads or private employment agency referrals, employers 
use a larger number of screening methods, though the differences are small and only statistically 
significant for newspaper ads.  When new hires are generated by referrals from friends, 
employers use slightly fewer screening methods. 
The result that for-profit firms experience substantially shorter vacancy duration (a 33% 
increase in the hazard rate relative to nonprofit firms) is interesting in light of the earlier finding 
that for-profit firms use fewer recruitment methods than nonprofits.  One interpretation is that the 
average nonprofit firm seeks to attract a particular type of worker, namely one that is intrinsically 
motivated by the organizational mission.  This type of highly-specific search would require more 
recruitment methods on average and a longer time to find the right match for the position.  This 
interpretation is consistent with the literature on nonprofit firms, in which it is argued that 
workers in nonprofit firms receive some nonpecuniary rewards derived from their empathy 
towards the organizational mission.  
Finally, a number of the other firm and industry controls and job tasks have a significant 
effect on vacancy duration.  Franchises, as well as firms in the agriculture, forestry and fishing 
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industries, experience shorter vacancy duration.  Vacancies in public administration take 
considerably longer to fill than those in construction; this is expected since Civil Service 
procedures require a series of codified steps for filling vacancies.  Positions requiring daily use 
of writing or a computer take longer to fill, with associated reductions in the hazard rate of 10% 
and 25%, respectively.  In the presence of these task variables, there is no economically 
significant effect of skill level, as measured by whether the position requires a college degree, on 
vacancy duration.  Although the city effects are not individually significant, a likelihood ratio 
test for their joint significance has a p-value of 0.038.  Likelihood ratio tests for each of the other 
underlined categories of coefficients have p-values less than 0.001. 
In summary, the duration regression is consistent with the theoretical model in that some 
recruitment methods (community agency referrals and accepting walk-ins) are associated with 
shorter durations and other methods (private employment agencies, newspaper advertisements, 
and referrals from friends) are associated with longer durations, even controlling for firm 
characteristics and the skill requirements of jobs.  Some further interpretation can be offered 
about the relationship between recruitment methods and vacancy duration in light of the 
theoretical model, but I defer this discussion to the following subsection since it also relates to 
starting wages. 
 
5.3 How Do Starting Wages Vary With Recruitment Choice? 
 Although the traditional human capital model that forms the basis for most wage 
regressions does not explicitly recognize the role of recruitment choices in influencing wages, 
the theoretical framework presented in the previous section clearly predicts a relationship 
between recruitment choices and starting wages.  Recall that in that wage-posting model 
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employers can offer higher wages to fill positions faster.  Alternatively, employers can influence 
vacancy duration through their choice of recruitment strategies.  Thus, if an employer can alter 
vacancy duration through either wage offers or recruitment choice, we should expect these two 
variables to be correlated.  In the present section, we augment standard log starting-wage 
regressions to include the recruitment methods that generated the most recently hired worker.   
Although the wage-posting framework is appealing on a number of grounds, other factors 
not considered by the model might also contribute to an empirical relationship between 
recruitment choices and starting wages.  For example, different recruitment methods generate a 
different average match quality of new hires, and to the extent that the starting wage might 
partially reflect match quality, we would expect a relationship between chosen recruitment 
methods and starting wages.  I believe such considerations to be less important than the 
mechanism described in the wage-posting model, for the simple reason that the regressions 
control for the skill requirements of the job.  We must remember that we are seeking to explain 
starting wages for workers, not current wages.  Starting wages are based only on information the 
employer can collect up to the hiring date and not on observed worker performance after hiring.  
Much of the information about the quality of a worker-job match will only be revealed to the 
employer over the duration of the employment relationship and is not observable at the time of 
hiring. 
I begin the analysis with a simple specification in column 1 of Table 8 that includes only 
the recruitment method that generated the most recent hire on the right-hand side of the log 
starting-wage regression.  The reference group is recruitment through posting help wanted signs.  
All recruitment coefficients in this initial specification are positive and all except the one for 
walk-ins are statistically significant at the 10% level.  The estimated wage gaps (relative to help-
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wanted signs) are substantial, ranging from 12% to 70%.  The large positive coefficients are not 
surprising since the reference group consists of workers generated by help-wanted signs, 
typically a recruiting technique for low-skilled jobs.   
 The more important question, however, is what explanatory power the recruitment 
variables add to a standard log-wage regression.  I therefore include in the log-wage specification 
the standard human capital variables:  age, age squared, educational attainment, gender, etcetera.  
Each of columns 2 through 5 successively adds variables for personal characteristics, job 
characteristics (including tasks and occupation), firm characteristics, and industry controls.  I 
also estimated specifications that included city controls, though I do not report these because 
they look extremely similar to the reported specifications.   
When skill level is controlled for by including human capital variables in the model, each 
of the recruitment coefficients decreases substantially in magnitude, and referrals from state and 
community employment agencies become statistically insignificant.  Inclusion of job 
characteristics (both daily tasks and occupation) also induces reductions, albeit more modest 
ones, in the magnitudes of the recruitment coefficients.  The most dramatic change in this 
specification (moving from columns 2 to 3) concerns recruitment through school placement 
officers; this coefficient decreases by 50% and becomes statistically insignificant.  An 
interpretation, consistent with the results in Table 4 (the probit for school referrals), is that 
employers are more likely to recruit through school placement officers when jobs require certain 
regular tasks, such as daily reading and computer use.  Since such requirements are associated 
with higher starting wages, part of the apparent effect of “school referrals” in the first few wage 
regressions in fact reflects the omitted task requirements. 
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The specifications of greatest interest are those in columns 4 and 5 of Table 8, both of 
which control for personal characteristics, job characteristics, and firm characteristics.  In 
column 4, roughly half of the variation in log starting wages is explained by recruitment 
methods, personal characteristics, job characteristics, and firm characteristics.  Even in the 
presence of all of these controls, many of the recruitment effects are individually statistically 
significant and are associated with large positive wage effects.  These recruitment effects include 
newspaper advertisements, current employee referrals, private employment agency referrals, 
union referrals, and referrals from friends.  The associated wage gaps, relative to recruitment via 
help wanted signs, are in the range 13% to 15%, except for union referrals, which is 46%. 
 The final specification in column 5 adds industry controls.  Although this negligibly 
increases the R2, only two recruitment coefficients remain statistically significant at the 10% 
level in the presence of industry controls:  newspaper advertisements (with a wage gap of 9% 
relative to help wanted signs) and union referrals (with a wage gap of 42%).  Evidently much of 
the apparent variation in wages due to recruitment methods is in fact due to industry variation.4  
Although the statistical significance of the recruitment methods declines from specification 1 to 
specification 5, particularly when the industry controls are included, it should be mentioned that 
the sample size is also decreasing at the same time as variables with missing values are added to 
the specification.  So part of this may reflect decreasing sample size.  Furthermore, even though 
most of the recruitment variables are statistically insignificant at the 10% level in the most 
general specification, they are jointly significant.  The F statistic is 2.05 with an associated p-
value of 0.0251.   
Finally, the three recruitment methods that drop from statistical significance between 
columns 4 and 5 still have t-statistics in the neighborhood of 1.4 to 1.5 and have larger point 
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estimates than the other recruitment methods.  If the results of columns 4 and 5 are taken 
collectively, the conclusion is that a number of recruitment methods (in particular newspaper 
advertising and referrals from private agencies, unions, current employees and friends) are 
statistically significantly associated with starting wages, even in the presence of controls for 
characteristics of workers, firms, jobs, and industry.  The fact that hiring through newspaper 
advertisements is associated with higher starting wages is consistent with some recent findings 
by DeVaro and Fields (2004) showing that recruiting through newspaper advertisements is 
associated with higher levels of worker performance.  Hence, it is not surprising that the higher 
performance is accompanied by higher wages.   
 As a final interpretative point, an interesting pattern emerges when comparing the 
recruitment coefficients from the wage regressions of Table 8 to the corresponding coefficients 
in the duration model of Table 6.  Consider the five recruitment methods found to have large, 
positive, statistically significant associations with starting wages relative to help-wanted 
advertising: newspaper advertising, current employee referrals, private employment agency 
referrals, union referrals, and referrals from friends.  Of these five methods, the three that are 
statistically significant in the duration model of Table 6 (namely newspaper advertising, private 
employment agency referrals, and referrals from friends) are all associated with longer vacancy 
duration.  That is, the recruitment methods associated with the largest increases in starting wage 
tend to be the slower methods.  In contrast, the faster methods such as community employment 
agency referrals and accepting walk-ins have statistically insignificant associations with starting 
wages and have the smallest magnitudes of any of the recruitment methods.  The theoretical 
framework of the preceding section offers a potential explanation for this pattern of results.  
Recall from the wage-posting model that as the recruitment campaign progresses, employers will 
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only increase posted wage offers; they will never decrease them.  So any recruitment method that 
lengthens the vacancy duration (such as informal referrals from friends) suggests, on average, 
relatively higher posted wage offers and, therefore, higher starting wages.   
The most notable empirical result that deviates from this general pattern concerns 
recruitment through union referrals.  Although the estimated starting-wage effect is positive and 
large for recruitment through union referrals, the estimated effect of union referrals on vacancy 
duration is essentially zero.  This is to be expected, however, since employers recruiting through 
union referrals are likely to face various hiring constraints imposed by unions that affect the 
process of wage determination.  The wage-posting framework of the preceding section would 
obviously be inappropriate for such hiring situations.  Finally, it must be acknowledged that 
although the finding that “slower” recruitment methods are associated with higher starting wages 
is consistent with the wage-posting theoretical model of the previous section, there may well be 
alternative theories for explaining this pattern of empirical results. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
As the sole means of generating a pool of job applicants, the choice of a recruitment 
strategy is clearly an important problem an employer faces in the process of hiring a new worker.  
Nevertheless, employer recruitment behavior is a relatively neglected area of empirical work in 
labor economics.  We lack even the most basic information about how recruitment choices vary 
across employer types and how they relate to wages and vacancy duration.  Until recently, 
extensive establishment-level data with sufficient detail to answer these questions about the 
recruitment behavior of employers has been unavailable.  I exploit a large, cross sectional 
establishment-level data set, the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, with rich information 
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about the recruiting behavior of employers, to partially bridge this gap in our knowledge.  Rather 
than summarizing the many empirical results of this paper, I conclude the discussion by 
recapitulating a few highlights and proposing some directions for future research. 
The fact that there exists a strong association between recruitment choices and starting 
wages in standard log-wage regressions in the presence of controls for worker characteristics, job 
characteristics, and firm characteristics, might seem hard to reconcile with standard theories of 
wage determination.  In fact, however, this is exactly what is predicted by a wage-posting 
framework in which employers face a multi-period recruitment problem, choosing recruitment 
methods and posting wage offers in the face of a tradeoff between hiring speed and expected 
match quality.  Although this pattern of results may be permissive of other theoretical 
interpretations, the wage-posting model is appealing at an anecdotal level and some of its main 
implications find support in the data.  This framework is also helpful in explaining why 
recruitment methods that are slower than others, such as informal referrals from friends, yield 
higher starting wages even in the presence of an extensive set of controls.  Methods that are 
slower but yield a higher-quality applicant pool imply longer vacancy durations and more 
opportunities for the employer to increase the posted wage offers as the recruitment campaign 
progresses. 
The results also suggest a difference in recruitment behavior between the for-profit and 
nonprofit sectors.  In particular, recruitment campaigns in the nonprofit sector take longer and 
involve more recruitment methods than those in the for-profit sector.  A potential explanation is 
that nonprofit firms seek to attract a particular type of worker who is sympathetic to and 
motivated by the organizational mission of the firm.  The need for such a highly-specific match 
necessitates a more vigorous recruitment campaign involving more methods, and suggests that a 
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longer search must be conducted before finding the right person.  Confirming or rejecting this 
interpretation would be a fruitful endeavor for future work, particularly since the empirical 
literature on nonprofits has focused almost exclusively on wage differentials, neglecting 
differences in the personnel policies of these organizations.      
Finally, a promising direction for future work would be to integrate an employer’s 
screening choices into the wage-posting theoretical framework discussed in this paper.  This 
paper has focused only on recruitment behavior.  As the sole means of creating a pool of 
applicants and generating the first wave of information used in hiring decisions, the topic of 
recruitment is important enough to study in isolation.  Furthermore, the channels of influence 
from recruitment methods to vacancy duration and wages are easiest to understand when 
abstracting from screening behavior.  Nevertheless, a complete understanding of the hiring 
process ultimately requires a melding of these employer recruitment decisions with the screening 
problems an employer confronts when selecting among a pool of applicants. 
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1
 The multivariate probit has historically been a rare guest in applied work involving a large number of 
discrete choices, requiring as it does the computation of high-dimensional integrations of the multivariate normal 
density function.  Fortunately, the development of simulation methods in recent years has rendered this model 
tractable for the case of many binary choices (ten in this case).  The multivariate probit model is estimated by the 
method of simulated maximum likelihood, using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) smooth recursive 
simulator to evaluate the 10-dimensional integrations of the multivariate normal distribution that appear in the 
likelihood function.  The model was estimated using 100 random draws for calculating the simulated likelihood and 
converged in roughly 4.8 days on a desktop computer.   
 
2
 Results are from standard probit models estimated equation by equation rather than from the multivariate 
probit model recently discussed.  For the purpose of displaying the relationships between individual firm 
characteristics and recruitment choices the multivariate probit model is somewhat inconvenient.  Marginal effects 
and their associated standard errors are more cumbersome to define and compute in the multivariate probit than in 
standard probits.  Since standard probits still yield consistent (albeit less efficient) estimates of the parameters of 
interest, I report these. 
 
3
 The Weibull model is parameterized as a proportional hazard model, with baseline hazard h0(t) = ptp-1 
where p is a nonnegative shape parameter to be estimated.  Since h(tj) = h0(t)g(xj), the covariates have a 
multiplicative effect on the hazard function.  The function g is the relative risk: g(xj) = exp(xjβ).  The Weibull model 
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nests the exponential, characterized by a constant hazard rate, as the special case for which p = 1.  The Weibull for p 
≠ 1 is characterized by a monotone hazard rate that either increases or decreases exponentially with time; the 
reported results strongly suggest a constant hazard.  
 
4
 Although within these broad industry categories many of the recruitment methods appear not to be 
associated with wages (in the presence of controls), there is the possibility that one of the effects being captured by 
the industry controls reflects a “preference” for recruitment method by firms in that industry.  That is, firms within 
an industry share a bundle of recruitment methods.  This point was suggested by an anonymous referee. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics for MCSUI Employer Data 
 
Observations (broken down by city and time of survey) 
Detroit 
Los Angeles 
Boston 
Atlanta 
June 8, 1992 - March   9, 1993 
March 5, 1993 - March 15, 1995 
March 5, 1993 - March 15, 1995 
March 8, 1993 - May    19, 1994 
804 
1010 
889 
807 
Total Observations 3510 
 
Firm Size (including temporary and contract workers) 
Mean 657 
Minimum 1 
0.25 quantile 15 
Median 55 
0.75 quantile 234 
Maximum 102,000 
 
Other Firm Characteristics  
For-profit companies 
Franchises 
76% 
6% 
% Operating on only 1 site 38% 
Average number of sites (if >1) 60 
Median number of sites (if >1) 3 
% with positive fraction of employees covered by collective bargaining 26% 
Average % of employees covered by collective bargaining (given greater      
than 0%) 67% 
% of firms with some contract workers     
% of firms with some temporary workers 
30% 
36% 
 
Percent of Firms in Each Industry  
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.03% 
Mining 0.62% 
Construction 1.97% 
Manufacturing 20% 
Transportation 5.54% 
Wholesale Trade 7.47% 
Retail Trade 15% 
Finance 7.32% 
Services  40% 
Public Administration 1.37% 
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TABLE 2   
Recruitment Methods Used For Most Recent Hire 
   1.  Help Wanted Signs 26% 
   2.  Newspaper Ads 49% 
   3.  Accepting Walk-ins 66% 
   4.  Referral from Current Employee 82% 
   5.  State Employment Agency 35% 
   6.  Private Employment Agency 22% 
   7.  Community Employment Agency 28% 
   8.  School Placement Officer Referral 40% 
   9.  Union Referral 7% 
   10. Referral from Friend or Acquaintance 38% 
Note: Entries are percentage of employers who used that method when 
recruiting the most recently hired worker. 
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TABLE 3 
  Which Recruitment Methods Tend to Be Bundled Together or Used Apart? 
 
Panel A 
Correlation Matrix for Recruitment Methods Chosen in Campaign to Hire Most Recent Worker 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Help Wanted 1         
2. Newspapers 0.10** 1        
3. Walk-ins 0.20** 0.13** 1       
4. Current 0.17** 0.12** 0.28** 1      
5. SEA 0.16** 0.14** 0.18** 0.18** 1     
6. PEA 0.02 0.05** 0.04** 0.07** 0.24** 1    
7. CEA 0.16** 0.12** 0.20** 0.14** 0.48** 0.27** 1   
8. Schools 0.16** 0.16** 0.17** 0.15** 0.26** 0.12** 0.35** 1  
9. Unions 0.08** 0.03* 0.05** 0.04** 0.17** 0.12** 0.22** 0.14** 1 
10. Friends 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05** 0.01 0.05** 0.09** 0.14** 0.04** 
 
Panel B 
Correlation Matrix for Cross-Equation Disturbances from Multivariate Probit Model 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Help Wanted 1                 
2. Newspapers 0.19** 1               
3. Walk-ins 0.25** 0.22** 1             
4. Current 0.31** 0.16** 0.40** 1           
5. SEA 0.22** 0.31** 0.29** 0.36** 1         
6. PEA 0.05 0.05 0.13** 0.16** 0.36** 1       
7. CEA 0.11** 0.16** 0.32** 0.18** 0.71** 0.47** 1     
8. Schools 0.18** 0.15** 0.30** 0.24** 0.41** 0.21** 0.50** 1   
9. Unions 0.05 0.01 0.21** 0.15** 0.38** 0.28** 0.54** 0.24** 1 
10. Friends -0.03 -0.09* -0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.06 0.16** -0.02 
 
Notes:  In both panels, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels 
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TABLE 4  
Marginal Effects from Individual Probit Models of Recruitment Choice 
 Help Wanted Signs Newspaper Walk-Ins 
Current 
Employees 
State  
Emp. Agency 
Firm Characteristics 
-0.183 -0.041 -0.106 -0.011 -0.115 For Profit 
0.042** 0.051 0.045** 0.032 0.050** 
0.067 -0.112 0.010 0.094 -0.067 Franchise 
0.040* 0.051** 0.057 0.030** 0.044 
0.073 -0.031 0.059 0.028 0.057 Thousands of Sites 
0.026** 0.035 0.048 0.032 0.030* 
-0.018 -0.012 0.021 0.005 0.000 Firm Size in Thousands 
0.007** 0.009 0.010** 0.004 0.003 
0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 Union 
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000** 0.000 
0.074 -0.017 0.082 0.065 0.129 Temps 
0.026** 0.036 0.032** 0.023** 0.033** 
0.072 0.031 0.008 0.030 0.069 Contracted 
0.027** 0.035 0.033 0.023 0.033** 
Industry Characteristics 
0.560 -0.254 -0.324 0.175 -0.191 Agriculture 
0.250* 0.284 0.209 0.012 0.169 
0.229 -0.203 0.006 0.017 -0.203 Mining 
0.216 0.190 0.080 0.053** 0.093 
0.024 0.074 -0.024 0.007 -0.022 Manufacturing 
0.082 0.079 0.101 0.072 0.068 
-0.085 0.087 -0.150 0.021 -0.106 Transportation 
0.067 0.107 0.095 0.067 0.080 
-0.083 -0.013 0.121 0.046 -0.123 Wholesale Trade 
0.066 0.093 0.075 0.051 0.061* 
0.057 -0.009 0.013 0.012 -0.077 Retail Trade 
0.089 0.084 0.087 0.060 0.067 
-0.082 0.076 0.001 0.064 -0.153 Finance 
0.068 0.088 0.081 0.053 0.056** 
-0.032 0.027 -0.067 -0.076 -0.095 Services 
0.078 0.080 0.143 0.116 0.066 
0.105 0.074 0.147 0.058 -0.142 Public Admin 
0.134 0.145 0.035 0.028 0.087 
Job Characteristics 
0.061 -0.009 -0.124 -0.069 0.002 Talk 
0.027** 0.041 0.037** 0.026** 0.031 
0.029 0.034 0.050 0.007 -0.014 Phone 
0.026 0.040 0.031** 0.024** 0.035 
-0.021 0.075 -0.063 -0.052 0.036 Read 
0.025 0.033** 0.034 0.025 0.029 
-0.044 -0.017 0.029 -0.002 -0.004 Write 
0.027 0.038 0.033* 0.023** 0.033 
0.004 0.048 0.032 0.062 0.027 Math 
0.025 0.034 0.034 0.025 0.030 
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 Help Wanted Newspaper Walk-Ins 
Current 
Emp. State Agency 
Job Characteristics cont. 
0.068 0.080 0.081 -0.030 -0.008 Computer 
0.024** 0.034** 0.044 0.033** 0.033 
-0.056 0.020 0.154 -0.027 0.068 Sales 
0.036 0.050 0.050* 0.046 0.046 
-0.023 0.078 0.170 0.004 0.113 Service 
0.042 0.067 0.043** 0.038 0.071* 
-0.011 -0.047 -0.076 -0.033 0.206 Labor/Operator 
0.045 0.060 0.046** 0.035 0.062 
-0.122 0.044 -0.074 -0.027 -0.013** Requires College 
0.031** 0.052 0.038* 0.030 0.046 
0.009 -0.068 -0.045 -0.003 -0.076 Atlanta 
0.029 0.038* 0.039** 0.029 0.033** 
0.043 0.044 0.070 -0.028 -0.016 Boston 
0.031 0.042 0.040 0.033 0.037 
0.065 0.110 -0.106 -0.011 -0.057 Detroit 
0.036* 0.045** 0.045* 0.032 0.038 
N 2606 2605 2603 2601 2592 
Pseudo-R2 0.087 0.039 0.084 0.045 0.052 
 
Note:  Standard errors are below coefficients.  ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% 
levels respectively.  Number of sites and the number of employees within establishment are 
measured in thousands, so that the coefficient estimates and standard errors represent 1000 times 
the values for the marginal effect of adding one more establishment or one more employee. 
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TABLE 4 Continued 
 
Private 
Emp. Agency 
Community 
Emp. Agency Schools Unions Friends 
Firm Characteristics 
0.024 -0.080 0.003 0.005 0.021 For Profit 
0.041 0.046* 0.048 0.011 0.047 
-0.034 -0.052 -0.044 0.023 0.021 Franchise 
0.054 0.040 0.049 0.022 0.057 
0.005 0.056 0.055 0.001 0.023 Thousands of Sites 
0.021 0.026** 0.030* 0.008 0.026 
-0.002 0.001 0.013 0.000 -0.004 Firm Size in Thousands 
0.002 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.003 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 Union 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000** 0.001 
0.085 0.151 0.021 -0.002 -0.084 Temps 
0.028** 0.031*** 0.036 0.010 0.034** 
0.011 0.025 0.038 0.016 0.012 Contracted 
0.029 0.031 0.035 0.010* 0.033 
Industry Characteristics 
0.650 0.563 -0.282 0.515 -0.264 Agriculture 
0.176** 0.208** 0.076 0.359** 0.152 
0.419 -0.185 0.062 -0.027 0.169 Mining 
0.247* 0.058* 0.087* 0.008 0.205 
0.057 -0.025 -0.005 -0.029 -0.076 Manufacturing 
0.062 0.066 0.101 0.010** 0.072 
0.017 -0.032 -0.087 -0.024 -0.058 Transportation 
0.073 0.072 0.087 0.008* 0.090 
0.058 -0.078 0.082 -0.032 -0.035 Wholesale Trade 
0.080 0.061 0.092 0.006** 0.084 
0.050 -0.012 0.034 -0.024 -0.139 Retail Trade 
0.072 0.070 0.093 0.011 0.068* 
-0.050 -0.071 0.139 -0.033 -0.094 Finance 
0.054 0.062 0.086 0.005** 0.073 
0.008 -0.002 0.166 -0.034 -0.065 Services 
0.058 0.068 0.148 0.016** 0.074 
0.000 0.024 0.072 -0.027 0.075 Public Admin 
0.103 0.124 0.038 0.007* 0.130 
Job Characteristics 
-0.079 0.064 0.027 0.023 0.063 Talk 
0.034** 0.029** 0.039 0.009** 0.036* 
0.077 -0.039 0.057 -0.017 0.000 Phone 
0.032* 0.032 0.032 0.013 0.038 
0.041 0.042 -0.011 0.011 -0.007 Read 
0.024* 0.026 0.035* 0.008 0.032 
0.031 0.023 0.005 0.023 0.053 Write 
0.029 0.033 0.033 0.009** 0.036 
0.027 -0.010 0.058 0.014 0.056 Math 
0.026 0.030 0.033 0.008* 0.033 
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Private 
Emp. Agency 
Community 
Emp. Agency 
 
Schools 
 
Unions 
 
Friends 
Job Characteristics cont. 
0.026 0.024 -0.005 0.010 0.016 Computer 
0.028 0.029 0.048* 0.010 0.033 
0.119 0.117 0.007 0.020 -0.127 Sales 
0.044** 0.043** 0.064 0.014 0.046** 
0.098 0.239 0.025 0.019 -0.069 Service 
0.063 0.068** 0.058 0.023 0.058 
0.132 0.159 0.114 0.067 -0.122 Labor/Operator 
0.067** 0.061** 0.050 0.033** 0.048** 
0.048 0.044 -0.066 -0.013 0.025 Requires College 
0.047 0.044 0.037** 0.012 0.048 
-0.024 -0.129 -0.086 -0.035 -0.017 Atlanta 
0.029 0.029** 0.040* 0.007** 0.038 
-0.002 -0.049 0.049 -0.030 -0.020 Boston 
0.034 0.033 0.042* 0.008** 0.040 
0.020 -0.046 0.049 -0.019 -0.085 Detroit 
0.036 0.034 0.003 0.008** 0.040** 
N 2602 2595 2599 2601 2605 
Pseudo-R2 0.059 0.080 0.072 0.226 0.041 
 
Note:  Standard errors are below coefficients.  ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
Number of sites and the number of employees in the establishment are measured in thousands, so that the coefficient 
estimates and standard errors represent 1000 times the values for the marginal effect of adding one more 
establishment or one more employee. 
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TABLE 5 
Mean Vacancy Duration by Method That Generated the 
Most Recent Hire 
Recruitment Method Weeks 
   1.  Help Wanted Signs 3.43 
   2.  Newspaper Advertisements 4.09 
   3.  Accepting Walk-Ins 2.40 
   4.  Current Employee Referrals 3.08 
   5.  State Employment Agency 2.64 
   6.  Private Employment Agency 5.56 
   7.  Community Employment Agency 3.74 
   8.  Referral from School Placement Officer 3.71 
   9.  Union Referral 1.18 
   10. Referral from Friends or Acquaintances 3.52 
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TABLE 6 
Parametric Weibull Model for Job Vacancy Duration 
 
Note: ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Results are in log relative-hazard form, meaning  
that coefficients above one imply a positive effect on the hazard  
rate (i.e. shorter vacancy duration) and those less than one imply  
a negative effect. 
 Hazard Ratio Z 
Recruitment Methods   
Help wanted signs 0.818 -1.92* 
Newspaper advertisement 0.693 -5.36** 
Walk-ins 1.115 1.27 
Current employees 1.011 0.13 
State employment agency 0.856 -1.70* 
Private employment agency 0.668 -3.73** 
Community employment agency 1.232 2.25** 
School referrals 0.926 -1.01 
Union referrals 0.950 -0.33 
Friends 0.873 -1.96** 
Firm Characteristics   
For profit 1.329 2.78** 
Franchise 1.274 2.66** 
Number of sites 1.000     1.15 
Size 1.000     -5.08** 
Union 1.000     0.43 
Temps 0.988     -0.15 
Contract 0.910 -1.30 
Industry Characteristics   
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 3.752 2.73** 
Mining 1.035 0.15 
Manufacturing 0.846 -0.91 
Transportation 0.925 -0.40 
Wholesale trade 0.902 -0.50 
Retail trade 1.053 0.26 
Finance 0.786 -1.15 
Services 0.880 -0.70 
Public Administration 0.410 -3.48** 
Job Tasks   
Talk 1.035 0.43 
Phone 0.937 -0.88 
Read 1.004 0.05 
Write 0.905 -1.35 
Math 0.938 -0.84 
Computer 0.751 -3.78** 
Skill Level   
Sales Occupations 1.199 1.96** 
Service Occupations 1.183 0.99 
Laborers/Operators 1.212 1.33 
College Required 1.000 3.42** 
City Effects   
Atlanta 0.883 -1.23 
Boston 1.007 0.07 
Detroit 0.926 -0.75 
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TABLE 7 
 Average Number of Screening Methods Used 
 
How many screening methods were used if the principle 
recruitment method … 
 
Principle Recruitment 
Method Generated New Hire? Did NOT Generate New Hire? 
 
Difference 
Newspaper Advertisements 
Private Employ. Agency 
Referrals from Friends 
3.84 
3.76 
3.47 
3.63 
3.68 
3.71 
    0.21** 
0.08 
   -0.24** 
Note:  ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level
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TABLE 8  
 Log-Wage Regressions for Starting Wages 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Recruitment Methods      
Newspaper adv. 0.315 (0.064)** 
0.186 
(0.053)** 
0.135 
(0.051)** 
0.152 
(0.061)** 
0.089 
(0.054)* 
Walk-ins 0.012 (0.063) 
0.030 
(0.054) 
0.018 
(0.051) 
0.026 
(0.060) 
0.002 
(0.057) 
Current Employees 0.226 (0.066)** 
0.141 
(0.055)** 
0.102 
(0.051)** 
0.128 
(0.060)** 
0.088 
(0.059) 
State employment agency 0.119 (0.072)* 
0.033 
(0.064) 
0.068 
(0.066) 
0.060 
(0.075) 
0.011 
(0.071) 
Private employment agency 0.324 (0.063)** 
0.243 
(0.056)** 
0.144 
(0.064)** 
0.145 
(0.070)** 
0.095 
(0.062) 
Community employment agency 0.152 (0.086)* 
0.096 
(0.090) 
0.066 
(0.077) 
0.050 
(0.093) 
-0.004 
(0.088) 
School referrals 0.504 (0.164)** 
0.186 
(0.077)** 
0.095 
(0.065) 
0.086 
(0.083) 
0.051 
(0.087) 
Union referrals 0.698 (0.110)** 
0.533 
(0.108)** 
0.570 
(0.114)** 
0.463 
(0.133)** 
0.425 
(0.126)** 
Friends 0.239 (0.066)** 
0.153 
(0.055)** 
0.113 
(.052)** 
0.128 
(0.060)** 
0.081 
(0.058) 
Other 0.382 (0.067)** 
0.185 
(0.061)** 
0.116 
(0.064)* 
0.078 
(0.070) 
0.062 
(0.068) 
Personal Characteristics      
Male • 0.079 (0.029)** 
0.126 
(0.028)** 
0.132 
(0.031)** 
0.126 
(0.028)** 
Age  • 0.065 (0.008)** 
0.054 
(0.008)** 
0.052 
(0.009)** 
0.046 
(0.008)** 
Age squared • -0.0007 (0.000)** 
-0.0006 
(0.000)** 
-0.0006 
(0.000)** 
-0.0005 
(0.000)** 
College • 0.356 (0.034)** 
0.197 
(0.041)** 
0.157 
(0.047)** 
0.154 
(0.048)** 
Post college • 0.690 (0.101)** 
0.456 
(0.104)** 
0.429 
(0.115)** 
0.340 
(0.089)** 
Job Characteristics      
Talk • • -0.075 (0.027)** 
-0.107 
(0.031)** 
-0.096 
(0.033)** 
Phone • • -0.010 (0.037) 
0.0425 
(0.0451) 
0.024 
(0.041) 
Read • • 0.075 (0.022)** 
0.070 
(0.026)** 
0.063 
(0.026)** 
Write • • 0.160 (0.030)** 
0.155 
(0.033)** 
0.147 
(0.034)** 
Math • • 0.016 (0.028) 
0.039 
(0.033) 
0.033 
(0.032) 
Computer • • 0.039 (0.041) 
0.011 
(0.043) 
0.044 
(0.031) 
Sales Occupation • • -0.178 (0.045)** 
-0.164 
(0.053)** 
-0.153 
(0.053)** 
Services Occupation • • -0.403 (0.062)** 
-0.390 
(0.075)** 
-0.356 
(0.075)** 
Laborers/Operators Occupation • • -0.298 (0.057)** 
-0.287 
(0.064)** 
-0.304 
(0.065)** 
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Firm Characteristics      
For profit • • • -0.075 (0.048) 
-0.025 
(0.049) 
Franchise • • • -0.080 (0.037)** 
-0.036 
(0.041) 
Number of sites • • • -0.00003 (0.000) 
-0.00006 
(0.000)** 
Size • • • 0.001 (0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Union • • • 0.002 (0.001)** 
0.001 
(0.000)** 
Temps • • • 0.066 (0.031)** 
0.062 
(0.031)** 
Contract • • • 0.030 (0.032) 
0.024 
(0.031) 
Industry Characteristics      
Agriculture, forestry, & fishing • • • • -0.200 (0.108)* 
Mining • • • • 0.240 (0.067)** 
Transportation • • • • 0.042 (0.042) 
Wholesale trade • • • • -0.090 (0.041)** 
Retail trade • • • • -0.166 (0.037)** 
Finance • • • • -0.011 (0.038) 
Services • • • • 0.017 (0.033) 
Public administration • • • • 0.015 (0.079) 
Constant 1.874 (0.053)** 
0.569 
(0.137)** 
0.931 
(0.125)** 
0.977 
(0.151)** 
1.116 
(0.143)** 
N 3029 2593 2496 2109 2037 
R2 0.07 0.38 0.47 0.49 0.49 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  ** And * indicate significance at the 
5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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FIGURE 1
Relationship of Vacancy Duration and Starting Wage (Unconditional)
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FIGURE 2
 Relationship of Vacancy Duration and Starting Wage (Conditional)
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Captions: 
 
Figure 1: 
Note:  Slope coefficient of regression of vacancy duration (measured in weeks) on a constant and 
the starting wage.  Horizontal axis gives the subsample over which the regression was run.  For 
example, “4” indicates that the sample includes only those employers who filled the position in 
less than four weeks. 
 
Figure 2: 
Note:  Slope coefficient of regression of vacancy duration (measured in weeks) on a constant, the 
starting wage, firm characteristics, industry controls, occupation controls, and whether the 
position requires a college degree.  Horizontal axis gives the subsample over which the 
regression was run.  For example, “4” indicates that the sample includes only those employers 
who filled the position in less than four weeks.  
 
